Here is a synopsis of the major topics covered in the conversation, presented in bullet points: 1. National Interests vs. the Green Deal: Green Deal policy is not the pursuit of the general European interest, but primarily pursues the interests of member states and their politicians (e.g., Teresa Ribera pursues the Spanish interest) , . There is no such thing as a unified "European interest"; there are German interests, French interests, Polish interests, etc. , . , . The role of the Polish government is to look after the interests of the Polish taxpayer and industry in the face of this policy . 2 Beneficiaries of Climate Policy (Green Deal as Business): The Green Deal is "one big business deal" and international business . Although the entire European Union may lose, some players and countries will gain from this policy , . Wind turbine manufacturers (e.g., Germany, Denmark, Spain), energy storage manufacturers and countries with favorable geographic locations for photovoltaics will gain , . The introduction of taxes (e.g., ETS2) may serve mainly to "stuff the coffers" of producers and middlemen . Europe's pro-environmental policy is undermined by the fact that other continents (e.g., China, Brazil) are increasing emissions and have intensive, less environmentally friendly production that can replace European production , . 3 Lack of European Solidarity and Partisanship: In an era of instability, particularisms dominate, with each country seeking to solve its own problems, even at the expense of allies , . An example of partisanship is Germany's migration policy, which seeks to solve its internal problems and political instability by pushing migrants to Poland without regard to Poland's interests ,. European solidarity also collapsed during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Germany closed its borders to sanitary exports . Discussions about increasing military production are mainly aimed at placing more orders in the industries of stronger countries (e.g. France, Germany, Spain), rather than where weapons are most needed (as on NATO's eastern flank) . 4. Defense and Military Capabilities in Europe: Treaties (including the Polish-French treaty) do not guarantee security; they do not contain automaticity of action and do not ensure that allied soldiers will show up in the event of an attack , . France's rhetoric about Europe's strategic sovereignty is hollow, because non-threatened countries (France, Spain) see no need to bear the financial burden to strengthen the security of Poland or Finland ,, . Poland should focus on building capabilities and deterring the Russian Federation, working with allies who feel similarly threatened (like the Scandinavian and Baltic states), rather than wasting time convincing non-threatened states . 5 Spending vs. Actual Military Capabilities : The amount of military spending is not correlated with actual military capabilities (e.g., Germany spends nearly $90 billion, but does not have the best army) . Israel, being at war and having a stronger army (4th strongest in the world in terms of capabilities), spends relatively less ($31 billion) than Poland ($38 billion), which shows a disparity in efficiency , . Poland has a professional army, which is very expensive , . Israel bases its armed forces on a volunteer/conscription army and trained reserves, and has a relatively smaller corps of senior officers (generals in Israel are often younger than in Poland) , . Poland should expand its active reserves and move away from the model of a half-million-strong professional army, which is too expensive for demographic and economic reasons, to cheaper and better-trained reservists (as in Finland or Israel) . Russia will not invade Poland if Poland correctly builds a policy of deterrence, which requires acquiring real military capabilities, not just focusing on spending ,.